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APPAL AND ERRoR-EFFECT OF OVERRULING DEmuRRER TO BAD PARA-
GRAPHS OF COMPLAINTE--In an action to quiet title to real estate the plaintiff
filed a complaint in seven paragraphs. After demurrers to each para-
graph had been overruled, the cause proceeded to trial before the court
without a jury. The findings of fact and conclusions of law were in the
plaintiff's favor, and judgment was accordingly entered for him. The
defendant upon appeal, contends that the court erred in overruling the
demurrers to six of the paragraphs, claiming that they did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Held, judgment affirmed.1
In affirming the judgment the court proceeded upon the theory that
since the findings disclosed a right to the relief granted, and since all
the evidence necessary to support these findings would have been ad-
missible under the unattacked paragraph, no harm was done by any error
in overruling the demurrers. The effect of error in overruling demurrers
to a complaint which has both sufficient and insufficient paragraphs, where
the cause proceeds to trial and judgment, is a question which has been
raised frequently in Indiana. The decisions have not been harmonious.
Probably the first Indiana case in which the problem arose was Findley v.
Bullock.2 There the court held that such error was not reversible. That
decision was, however, based upon a special statute, which provided that
"when there are several counts, one of which is faulty, and entire damages
are given, the verdict shall be good."3 This provision was not incorporated
into the Code of 1851, nor has it since been re-enacted.
At present there are three statutes which would seem to touch upon
the problem. They are sections 368, 426, 725 of Burns.4 Sec. 368 provides
that "no objections taken by demurrer and overruled shall be sufficient to
reverse the judgment, if it appears from the whole record that the merits
of the cause have been fairly determined." Sec. 426 states that "the
court must, in every state of the action, disregard any error in the plead-
ings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the
adverse party." See. 725 provides, in effect, that a judgment must not be
reversed for any defect in the pleading which might have been cured by
the lower court by amendment. It further declares "nor shall any judg-
ment be stayed or reversed, in whole or in part, where it shall appear to
the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and deter-
mined in the court below."
For many years the Indiana courts held that where there was a com-
plaint containing both good and insufficient paragraphs, and demurrers
had been erroneously overruled, the rule was that the judgment was pre-
sumed to be affected by the bad paragraphs5 and would be reversed unless
1 Boflenbacher v. Miller, Appellate Court of Indiana, Jan. 15, 1932, 179 N. E. 556.
21 Blackf. (Ind.) 467 (1818).
$Rev. Code, p. 323.
'Revision of 1926.
5Lake Erie & Western By. v. McFall (1905), 165 Ind. 574, 76 N. E. 400; Balti-
more, etc., R. B. v. Jones (1901), 158 Ind. 87, 62 N. E. 994.
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the record affirmatively disclosed that it was based upon a good para-
graph or paragraphs.6 It is difficult to see how this result was reached
under the statutes pointed out above. Most of the cases in which it was
stated ignored them altogether.
The result reached in the principal case may well be considered to be
in conflict with that rule. The mere fact that all the evidence necessary
to support the findings were admissible under the good paragraph would
not necessarily show that the court based the judgment upon it. How-
ever, there is another doctrine upon which the decision can be supported.
The courts have frequently held that where there are special findings7 or
a special verdicts any error in overruling a demurrer to a pleading is im-
material. The theory is that if the facts found show a right to relief in
the plaintiff no harm is done, and it would be useless to remand the cause
for further proceedings. Since the facts found in the principal case showed
a right in the plaintiff to the relief granted, the case falls squarely within
this rule. Since all the necessary evidence was properly admitted, the
defendant has no grounds at all upon which to complain. The court surely
committed no error in refusing to reverse the judgment.
It is likely that the result would have been the same had the judgment
been entered upon a general verdict rather than upon special findings, if
the verdict were rendered upon proper instructions and sufficient evidence.
A number of recent cases have held that where a demurrer to an insufficient
complaint is overruled there is no reversible error if evidence which
supplied the deficiency was admitted without objection and the cause was
fairly tried upon its merits, even though the judgment was entered upon a
general verdict.9 One of these cases, all of which have been decided in
the Appellate Court, has been reversed in the Supreme Court, but it was
upon another point.10 While this rule has not gone entirely uncontra-
dicted,"1 it is to be hoped that it will be accepted as a correct statement
of the law, as it seems to be the only logical result under the Code.12 Most
of the cases in which this doctrine was advanced involved situations where
there was only one paragraph of complaint. But it seems impossible to
point out any material distinctions between a case involving a bad com-
plaint in one paragraph and a case where there are several paragraphs
involved, some good and some bad. If one case is to be decided upon the
evidence without regard to the pleadings, the other must likewise be so
decided.
the record affirmatively disclosed that it was based upon a good para-
'Lake Erie & "TV. By. Co. v. McFall (1905), 165 Ind. 574, 76 N. E. 400; Balti-
more, etc., R. R. v. Jones (1901), 158 Ind. 87, 62 N. E. 994; Rowe v. Peabody
(1885), 102 Ind. 198, 1 N. D. 353; Bailey v. Troxell (1873), 43 Ind. 432; Wolf v.
Scholfeld (1871), 38 Ind. 175.
7 Pleasant School Township v. Fultz (1922), 79 Ind. App. 27, 137 N. E. 60; Eis-
nan v. Whalen (1906). 39 Ind. App. 350, 79 N. D. 514; Woodward v. Mitchell
(1895), 140 Ind. 406, 49 N. ]V. 437.
3Pape v. Randall (1897), 18 Ind. App. 53, 47 N. E. 530.
9 Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. B. R. v. Gillespie (1930), - Ind. App. -, 173 N. E.
708; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. B. B. v. Rushton (1925), 90 Ind. App. 227, 148 N. E.
337; Terre Haute, I. & E. Traction Co. v. Scott (1925), 91 Ind. App. 690, 149 N. E.
454.
t Terre Haute, I. & E. Traction Co. v. Scott (1926), 197 Ind. 587, 150 N. E. 777.
"So. Ind. Gas & Electric Co. v. Winstead (1931), 92 Ind. App. 329, 175 N. B.
281, 6 Ind. Law J. 575 (1931).
16 Ind. Law J. 402 (1931).
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The conclusion seems inevitable, then, that the improper overruling of
demurrers to a complaint containing both good and insufficient para-
graphs does not amount to reversible error where there is a special finding
or a special verdict, and a defendant can have no grounds for complaint
if such findings are supported by evidence properly admissible under a
good paragraph. In fact, under the cases last cited even if the judgment
were based upon a general verdict and some or all of the paragraphs
of the complaint were faulty, the judgment would stand if the evidence
showed a right to the relief given and was either properly admissible
under a good paragraph (since such evidence should have the same effect
as that admitted without objection) or was admitted improperly but
without objection. W.H.H.
ADoPTIoN-DOMICM --IFANT--RESiDENCE--The infant daughter of
parents domiciled in X county was sent by her mother, after the death of
her father, to live with appellants in Y county. The mother died a few
days thereafter on May 16, 1930. On this same day the parents of the
mother filed a verified petition for the adoption of said child in the circuit
court of X county, and on June 2, 1930, an order of adoption was entered
by said court.
Meanwhile the appellants had filed their verified petition in the circuit
court of Y county on May 23, 1930, for the adoption of said child, and on
that day an order of adoption was entered. On June 12, 1930, the afore-
said grandparents of the child who has procured the order of adoption
in X county, filed a verified petition in the circuit court of Y county,
asking said court to vacate its order of adoption of May 23, 1930. After
hearing the evidence, the court of Y county did vacate its order on the
ground that since the child was not a "resident" of Y county, the court
there had no jurisdiction to enter an order of adoption. The statute in
question reads as follows: "Any person desirous of adopting any child
may file his petiffion therefor in the circuit court in the county where
such child resides."' Appellants appealed after motion for a new trial
was overruled. Held, judgment affirmed. The word "resides" as used in
the statute refers to "domicile" of the child.2
The legal domicile of the child was obviously in X county. An infant
not being sui juris is incapable of fixing or changing its domicile.3 The
domicile of an infant is that of its father during his lifetime, and at his
death becomes that of the mother.4 If both parents have died, the domicile
last derived from them continues to be the domicile of the child until it
reaches majority and effects a change thereof, or until said domicile is
changed by law.5
The troublesome question is encountered in attempting to ascertain the
intended meaning of the word "resides" as used by the legislature. Was
I Burns' R. S. 1926, Sec. 913.2
,Johnmon v. Smith, Appellate Court of Indiana, March 11, 1932, 180 N. E. 188.
S Warren v. Hofer (1859), 13 Ind. 167.
4Inre Thorne (1925), 240 N. Y. 444, 148 N. E. 630.5 See Hiestand v. Kuns (1847), 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 345; Warren v. Hofer (1859),
13 Ind. 167, and Whee~er v. Burrows (1862), 18 Ind. 14.
